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     Abstract—Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) 
play an important role in the movement of crude oil from 
its production sites to the end users. Such systems are 
complex because they often operate in a dynamic 
environment. Therefore, safe operations of the key 
components in the systems such as port and transportation 
are vital for the success of PTSs. Risk assessment is a 
powerful tool to ensure the safe transportation of crude oil. 
This paper applies a mathematical model to identify and 
evaluate the operational hazards associated with PTSs, by 
combining a Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) method and 
Bayesian Networks (BNs). This hybrid model has been 
found capable of assisting decision-makers in measuring 
and improving the PTSs’ safety, and dealing with the 
inherent uncertainties in risk data. 
Keywords— Bayesian belief network, fuzzy set theory, maritime 
risk, maritime transport, petroleum transportation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) play a critical 
role in the flow of crude oil within a Petroleum Supply Chain 
(PSC). The PTSs enable the movement of crude oil from point 
A to point B, via land or sea. Ports and transportation modes 
are the basic elements in a PTS. To ensure the smooth flow of 
the product within the system, tankers and pipelines are the 
two most commonly used transportation modes [1, 2]. While 
ports act as a connecting point between the transportation 
modes, pipelines and tankers are used for inland and sea 
transportation respectively. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration [3] stated 
that, in 2013, 56.5 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) were 
transported by sea. In other words, about 63% of total world 
crude oil production (i.e. 90.1 million bbl/d) is moved using 
PTSs. Petroleum production and consumption is highly 
associated with economic development. Therefore, it is crucial 
to identify and assess the hazards affecting PTSs and to ensure 
the overall safety and reliability of the systems. 
The aim of this paper is to apply an advanced risk 
assessment technique for evaluating the risk of the PTSs’ 
operational hazards. In this paper, an established Fuzzy Rule-
Based Bayesian Networks (FRBN) methodology is adapted. 
The Bayesian Network (BN) mechanism is used to aggregate 
all IF-THEN rules with belief structures, to produce the 
hazards’ failure priority values. This assessment model is 
capable of aiding decision-makers to understand the PTSs’ 
safety, in order to enhance the effectiveness of their 
operations. To accomplish this aim, the paper starts with the 
identification of the research gap of previous PTSs studies in 
Section Ⅱ. It is followed by an overview of Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) and BN methods.  Section Ⅲ 
includes a step-by-step description of the methodology that 
has been used for evaluating and prioritising the risk levels of 
the PTSs’ operational hazards. The proposed methodology is 
demonstrated by investigating a real PTS in Section Ⅳ. 
Finally, the conclusion, with the discussion of future work, is 
presented in Section Ⅴ. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Risk Assessment of Petroleum Transport 
The nature of PSC requires that a high priority is placed on 
safety. Risk management plays a critical role in ensuring the 
transportation system resilience in the context of PSCs. Recent 
studies highlight the importance of the PTSs’ safety in the 
movement of the crude oil. A careful literature review has 
revealed that several studies have been conducted on 
operational risk and reliability relating to PTSs, but most have 
the analysis conducted from a segment (i.e. port, ship, or 
pipeline), instead of a systematic perspective. For instance, 
studies such as [4-6] focused on the local level of the 
transportation modes, while studies such as [7, 8] focused on 
the petroleum ports.  Within the context of supply chains, 
optimal risk controls at segment/local levels may not 
necessarily ensure the highest safety at the system/global level.  
It therefore reveals a research gap to be fulfilled.  
The interlinked PTSs form a complex system. This is 
evidenced by the fact that there are multiple sub-systems (i.e. 
ports, tankers and pipelines) involved in its operations. 
Therefore, in this paper, each of these three key systems was 
first investigated, to identify the associated hazards associated. 
A failure in the PTSs is not necessarily due to the occurrence 
of a whole series of errors. A single failure or mistake might 
be the cause leading to the system’s failure. The hazards 
within petroleum ports and transportation modes (i.e. ship and 
pipeline), have been analysed by carrying out a careful 
identification process (i.e. literature review). The identified 
hazards have been further verified by domain experts.  
B. Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning 
FMEA has been defined as a step-by-step procedure for 
evaluating safety and reliability of failure modes and effects 
[9]. FMEA is one of the most common techniques in safety 
and reliability analysis. In the traditional FMEA, the level of 
safety of each failure mode is determined by three parameters; 
Likelihood (Lk), Consequence (Cs) and Probability (Pb) [10].  
However, the traditional FMEA method has some 
drawbacks that have been criticised by various researchers, 
such as the problem associated with the Risk Priority Number 
(RPN) [11-13]. 
To overcome these problems, and enhance the FMEA 
performance, uncertainty based techniques, such as artificial 
neural networks [18], Dempster-Shafer theory [15], fuzzy set 
theory [14], grey theory [12], evidential reasoning [16], and 
Monte Carlo simulation [17] have been proposed. FRBN was 
developed to overcome the FMEA drawbacks, in order to 
identify failure priority values, by using the mechanism of 
Bayesian Reasoning to conduct Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) risk 
inference [19]. 
A BN method was developed in the 1970s, based on the 
marriage of the basic Bayesian theory (developed by Bayes in 
the 1960s). A BN is a graphical model that provides a 
decision-support framework for problems involving 
uncertainty, complexity and probabilistic reasoning [20, 21]. 
In addition, a BN demonstrates the fundamental concept of 
probabilistic graphical models, or probabilistic networks.  
A BN model is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). The 
traditional BN graphical structure consists of: 1) a set of 
nodes, representing variables connected by 2) a set of edges 
representing the dependence between these variables [22, 23]. 
The direction of the edge represents the relationship of each 
node to another node [19]. Parent, child, root and leaf nodes 
are the four types of nodes in the traditional BN. The edge 
starts from the parent node and ends with an arrowhead 
pointing to the child node. However, “root” nodes are those 
without links directed to parent nodes, and nodes without child 
nodes are called “leaf” nodes [22-24]. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
For assessing the risk of the hazards associated with the 
PTSs, a model is constructed and an amalgamation of FRB in 
FMEA and BN is employed in this paper. A FRB is employed 
to model the conditional statements as well as incorporate the 
overall knowledge. In addition, a BN is used to provide a 
decision-supporting framework, for the evaluation of the 
hazards associated with the petroleum ports’ and 
transportation modes’ operations within the PTSs, through the 
use of probabilistic reasoning. For analysing the PTSs’ 
operational hazards, the analysis procedure is presented in Fig. 
1 as follows: 
 
Fig. 1. The PTSs’ assessment model flow chart 
A. Identify the PTSs Hazards (Step 1) 
This step identifies the Hazards (Hs) related to PTSs. This 
identification process provides decision-makers with a clear 
picture of the hazards associated with the working 
environment to ensure the safety of the system. 
The PTSs consist of two sub-systems: ports and 
transportation modes. Tankers and pipelines are the two major 
transportation modes within this system. Therefore, in order to 
determine the Hs that affect the safety operations of a PTS, an 
extensive literature review and consultation with domain 
experts has been carried out. Consequently, the hazards that 
are most influential on the PTSs’ operation are illustrated in 
Fig. 2.  
B. Establish Fuzzy IF-THEN Rules within FMEA (Step 2) 
As mentioned earlier in section II.B, three risk parameters 
are employed to analyse failure modes in the traditional 
FMEA. For constructing a fuzzy IF-THEN rule with a belief 
structure for PTSs, the occurrence probability of a risk event 
during the process of oil transport (Pl), consequence severity 
that the risk event causes when it occurs (Sc) and probability 
that the risk event cannot be detected before it occurs (Dp) are 
FMEA factors. Pl, Sc and Dp are the three risk parameters that 
are used in the IF part, while, in the THEN part, the risk level 
(R) is presented. Very High, High, Medium, Low, and Very 
Low are the set of linguistic variables used to describe Pl, Sc, 
Dp and R [8, 25, 26]. These grades describe the linguistic 
variables of each attribute associated with the PTSs’ Hs. 
Through considering experts’ judgements, the degree of each 
parameter is valued with regard to each identified hazard, 
where each parameter is defined based on knowledge accrued 
from past events. 
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Fig. 2.Main hierarchical structure of the hazards in the PTSs 
In the FRB, a belief structure is utilised to model the THEN 
part in the IF-THEN rule. For example: 
 Rule 1: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is 
Very High, THEN R is Very High with 100%, High 
with 0%, Medium with 0%, Low with 0% and Very 
Low with 0%. 
 Rule 2: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is 
High, THEN R is Very High with 67%, High with 
33%, Medium with 0%, Low with 0% and Very Low 
with 0%. 
  Rule 3: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is 
Medium, THEN R is Very High with 67%, High with 
0%, Medium with 33%, Low with 0% and Very Low 
with 0%. 
 Rule 4: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is 
Low, THEN Rs is Very High with 67%, High with 0%, 
Medium with 0%, Low with 33% and Very Low with 
0%. 
The proportion method has been used to assign belief 
degrees in the THEN part, for each of the linguistic variables 
in the above four rules. To simplify this, the risk factors that 
obtain similar grade in the IF part, are divided by the total 
number of parameters. To rationalise the assignment of the 
degree of belief of a certain grade in the THEN part for each 










where D(x) is the belief degree for Very High, High, 
Medium, Low, or Very Low in the THEN part, n represent the 
number of factors in the IF part, and ai(x) describes the grades 
of a specific linguistic variable of each attribute associated 
with the Hs. For example, in Rule 1, three risk factors obtain 
the Very High grade in the IF part. Therefore, the belief 
degree for Very High in the THEN part is calculated as 100% 
(3/3 = 100%). Conversely, two risk parameters have the Very 
High grade and one gets the High grade in the IF part in Rule 
2. Therefore, the belief degrees belonging to Very High and 
High in the THEN part are 67% (2/3 = 67%) and 33% (1/3 = 
33%), respectively. For risk evaluation of a petroleum port, 
pipeline and ship, 125 rules (5 × 5 × 5) with their belief 
degrees are presented [19] (see Table I). 
C. Develop a BN Model and Aggregate the Rules by using BN 
(Steps 3 and 4) 
In this step, various BN models have been developed. Each 
model represents one of the PTSs’ hazard events that have 
been identified in the first step. BN is performed to confirm 
the relationship between the Hs and the established FRB with 
belief structure in FMEA, and to build a qualitative network 
capable of representing all the Hs and their dependencies (i.e. 
the three risk parameters).  
Table I. The Established IF-THEN Rules with Belief Structure for PTSs Risk 
Evaluation 
 
To aggregate the rules using a BN, the developed rules 
should first be presented in a conditional probability form. For 
example, Rule 2 in Table I is presented as follows: 
R2: IF Very High (P1), Very High (S1) and High (D2), 
THEN {(0.67, Very High (R1)), (0.33, High (R2)), (0, Medium 
(R3)), (0, Low (R4)), (0, Very Low (R5)),}. 
The conditional probability of Rule 2 can be expressed as 
follows: 
Given P1, S1 and D2, the probability of Rh (h = 1,…,5) is 
(0.67, 0.33, 0, 0, 0) or  
)0,0,0,33.0,67.0(),,( 211  PCLRi
 
(2) 
Where “  ” symbolises conditional probability.   
The FRB constructed in FMEA can be modelled and 
transferred by using the BN technique in four nodes. Three 
parent nodes represent Pl, Sc and Dp of each H; these three 
parent nodes are connected to a H (Node Rh). By converting 
the overall rule base into a customized BN model, the 
marginal probability of the H (i.e. child node) can be 
calculated, through simplifying the risk inference mechanism 
of the rule-base failure criticality evaluation. To marginalise 
Node Rh, the needed conditional probability table P(RhPl, Sc, 
Dp), can be obtain by using Eq. 2 and Table I, which 
symbolises a 5 × 5 × 5 × 5 table combination, having the 
values P(RhPl, Sc, Dp) (h, l, c, p = 1,…,5).  
Each of the identified PTSs’ Hs can be evaluated by using 
experts’ judgements, through considering the three risk factors 
(i.e. Pl, Sc and Dp) and their related defined linguistic grades. 
Moreover, for assigning the belief degree of the linguistic 
grades of each individual factor, the averaging technique is 
used through considering the perspective of multiple experts 
for supporting the prior probabilities calculation (i.e. P(Pl), 
P(Sc) and P(Dp)) of the three parent nodes, Pl, Sc and Dp. As a 
result, the marginal probability of each H (Rh) can be 
calculated as follows [10]: 
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(h = 1,…,5) (3) 
D. Prioritise the PTSs’ Hazards (Step 5) 
In the FRBN model, the marginal probability of each H is 
presented by the five linguistic terms (i.e. Very High, High, 
Medium, Low, and Very Low). To prioritise the PTSs’ 
hazards, a utility values approach (URh) developed by Yang 
[16] is used in this study. Consequently, the output belief 
degree of each Hs is aggregated in one single value as follows: 






where P(βh) is the H’s belief degree for each linguistic 
term. UR = (1,2,3,4,5) and URh  = (0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1). RH is the 
utility of the selected hazard. The higher the RH value is, the 
significant the level of risk of the hazard. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
A case study is carried out in this paper to determine how 
the methodology can be employed to evaluate the Hs 
associated with a specific PTS being investigated. This 
assessment is performed on the system of one of the world 
major petroleum producers. Due to the confidentiality, the 
associated ports and transport operators are kept anonymous. 
Three questionnaires were first constructed to collect the 
failure input information from experts involved in the 
investigated PTS. The selected experts are actively working at 
inshore and offshore terminals and petroleum ports, tankers 
and pipeline systems, with over 20 years’ working experience. 
In order to evaluate the PTS’ Hs, the system’ Hs are 
identified (step one). Through conducting a literature review 
and gathering experts’ personal experience, 42, 61, and 10 
hazards have been identified within port, ship and pipeline 
sub-systems, respectively. Due to the word limitation, seven of 
the PTS’ Hs are presented as sample of this evaluation process 
(see Fig. 2).   
 In step two, the established FRB table in section III.C is 
used. With the aim of gathering the failure information for the 
identified PTS’ Hs, three questionnaires were constructed and 
presented to fifteen experts (five from each operational sector), 
each with more than 20 years’ experience in the system’s 
operation. The first questionnaire was designed to evaluate the 
42 Hs relating to the petroleum ports. This survey was sent to 
five experts in the port operation sector. The second and third 
questionnaires were designed to evaluate the Hs associated 
with the tankers and pipelines respectively. The participants 
were invited to evaluate each of the Hs in their operation sector 
with respect to the three risk parameters. 
After the authors had received the feedbacks from the 
participants, the arithmetic mean was employed in order to 
collect the average of the three risk parameters of the 113 Hs 
(i.e. 42 (port) + 61 (ship) + 10 (pipeline)). The resulting values 
were then used in the form of prior probabilities (step 4). For 
example, for assessing the hazard of Company Policies 
(PPHC) by using the arithmetic averaging technique, the 
parameter P Very High is presented as a sample. Experts 1 - 5 
have assessed the parameter P Very High as: 5%, 10%, 10%, 5%, 
and 10%. By using the arithmetic mean, the average degree of 
belief is 8%. The same technique is used to identify the belief 
degree for PPHC hazard parameters (Table II) and the other 
112 PTSs Hs.   
Table II. Prior Probability of Lk, Cs and Pb for PPHC 
Risk Parameters Average degree of belief in % 
P 
Very High 8 
High 13.1111 
Medium 21. 1111 
Low 33. 8889 
Very Low 23.8889 
S 
Very High 10 
High 12. 7778 
Medium 22. 7778 
Low 29.4444 
Very Low 25 
D 




Very Low 21.1111 
In steps three and four, BN based FMEA models have 
been developed. By considering the complexity of the manual 
calculation, a computer software tool (i.e. Hugin software) is 
used to compute marginal probability for each of the 113 Hs 
that occur in the investigated PTS (see Fig. 3). 
As a result, the analysis values of PPHC can be expressed 
by using Eq. 3 as follows: 
P(Rh  Pl, Sc, Dp) = (7.96, 14.00, 22.85, 30.18, 25.00) 
 
Fig. 3. The analysis of PPHC by Hugin software 
 In step five, based on Eq. 4 and as shown in Table III, the 
utility value of PPHC is evaluated as 37.43.  
Table III: The Steps for Calculating the Utility Value of PPHC 
 
Based on the identified utility value for each of the 
selected PTS’ Hs, the hazard Collision between Ship and 
Other Ship/Berth (PTHS) is the most significant hazard, 
followed by Control System Failure (PTMC), Wrong use of 
Navigation Equipment (PSCW) and Ventilation System 
Failure (PSFV) (see Table IV). By using the same procedure, 
and after utilising the belief degree of the 113 Hs associated 
with the PTSs (i.e. port and transportation modes’ hazards), 
the hazard Procedural Failure (PTHP), is the most significant 
hazard in this system. 




H1  Company Policies (PPHC) 37.43 
H2 Control System Failure (PTMC) 49.72 
H3 Collision between Ship and Other Ship/Berth (PTHS)  53.75 
H4 Wrong use of Navigation Equipment (PSCW) 47.18 
H5 Ventilation System Failure (PSFV) 46.59 
H6 Pipeline Internal Corrosion (PPIP) 32.77 
H7 Third Party Activity (PPET) 35.97 
V. CONCLUSION 
Evaluation of operational hazards of the PTSs is an 
important element for the safety of the overall system, and can 
aid decision-makers to enhance its performance. This study is 
one of the first studies that deals with the data uncertainty 
problems in PTSs as a one complete system. In this paper, a 
mathematical model integrates FRB theory and BN to analyse 
the PTSs’ operational hazards in a complementary way. The 
FRBR method uses domain expert knowledge in the form of 
fuzzy IF-Then rules, and the BN mechanism to aggregate the 
rules for prioritising the PTSs Hs.  
In the proposed methodology, firstly, operational hazards 
within the PTSs are identified. Secondly, an FRB with a belief 
structure in FMEA is established. Thirdly, the rules are 
aggregated by using the developed BN model. Finally, the 
PTSs’ hazards are ranked by using the utility approach. The 
results from the case study reveal that the proposed method is 
capable of analysing the local levels of the PTSs and provide 
an improved evaluation technique for PTSs’ risk assessment. 
In terms of the case study based on one of the world major 
petroleum producers, PTHP, Ship Collision due to Human 
Fatigue (PSCF) and PTHS are its PTS’ most significant Hs. 
The results highlight the importance of human-related hazards 
within the PTSs. From previous engineering studies, human-
related hazards have a significant impact on systems 
operation, where the consequences of an operational mistake 
might lead to economic and environmental disasters. 
 The proposed assessment methodology provides decision-
makers with a rational risk-ranking technique for enhancing the 
safety of PTSs. In other words, the proposed method shows 
realistic and flexible results by describing the failure 
information based on real-life situations.  
 This paper mainly focused on evaluating the local levels of 
the PTSs. However, controlling the operational risk at local 
level may not ensure the safety of the PTSs. In future work, the 
global level of the PTSs will be evaluated. While the FRBN 
technique was used to assess the local level of the PTSs, the 
Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach can be applied to 
accomplish the PTSs evaluation, due to the approach’s 
capability in synthesizing the risk from segments to a system 
level.  
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